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The World Bank Social Safety Nets Primer is intended to provide a practical resource for those engaged in the 
design and implementation of safety net programs around the world. Readers will find information on good practices for 
a variety of types of interventions, country contexts, themes and target groups, as well as current thinking of specialists 
and practitioners on the role of social safety nets in the broader development agenda. Primer papers are designed to 
reflect a high standard of quality as well as a degree of consensus among the World Bank safety nets team and general 
practitioners on good practice and policy. Primer topics are initially reviewed by a steering committee composed of both 
World Bank and outside specialists, and draft papers are subject to peer review for quality control. Yet the format of the 
series is flexible enough to reflect important developments in the field in a timely fashion.  
The primer series contributes to the teaching materials covered in the annual Social Safety Nets course offered in 
Washington DC as well as various other Bank-sponsored courses. The Social Safety Nets Primer and the annual course 
are jointly supported by the Social Protection unit of the Human Development Network and by the World Bank 
Institute. The World Bank Institute also offers customized regional courses through Distance Learning on a regular 
basis. 
For more information on the primer paper series and papers on other safety nets topics, please contact the Social 
Protection Advisory Service; telephone (202) 458-5267; fax (202) 614-0471; email: socialprotection@worldbank.org. 
Copies of related safety nets papers, including the Social Safety Nets Primer series, are available in electronic form at 
www.worldbank.org/safetynets. The website also contains translated versions of the papers as they become available. 
An ambitious translation plan is underway (especially for Spanish and French, some in Russian). For more information 
about WBI courses on social safety nets, please visit the website www.worldbank.org/wbi/socialsafetynets.  
Papers in the Safety Nets Primer as of June 2005 
Theme Author 
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Disability Mitra,  Sophie 
 Preface 
 
This case study is part of six Country Case Study Reports that were commissioned in 2003 by the World 
Bank specifically for the purposes of a summary report on the design and implementation of household 
targeting systems in the following countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Brazil and the United 
States. Research findings and earlier drafts of the report were presented at numerous workshops and seminars 
(two in Brazil in November 2003; two at the World Bank in Washington in November 2003 and January 
2005; and one at the Second International Workshop of Conditional Cash Transfers in Sao Paulo in April 
2004).  The final version of the report as well as the other country case studies have been published as Social 
Protection Discussion Paper No. 0526 to 0532 and can be found at www.worldbank.org/safetynets. Abstract 
 
While targeting can effectively channel resources to the poor, implementation details matter tremendously to 
distributive outcomes.  Several key factors affect performance, including: data collection processes; 
information management; household assessment mechanisms; institutional arrangements; and monitoring 
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Bénédicte de la Brière (DFID) and Kathy Lindert (The World Bank) 
 
Summary 
This note was prepared at the request of officials from the Ministry of Social Assistance.  It seeks to 
examine Brazil’s main existing beneficiary registry and selection mechanism, the Cadastro Único, and to 
make recommendations that could help improve the targeting of social transfers to the poor.  The 
introduction of the new Bolsa Família program offers a historical opportunity to reduce poverty and 
inequality in Brazil.  A key ingredient into the success of this effort is the ability of the program to 
effectively channel resources to the poor.  As such, the introduction of the new program also provides an 
opportunity for the Government to revamp its cadastro into a more modern, cost effective and accurate 
targeting tool.  Fixing the cadastro is needed to promote targeting and to ensure the effectiveness of the new 
Bolsa Família program.  
 
The Existing Cadastro Único 
In 2001,
1 the federal government of Brazil launched a major effort to construct a single beneficiary 
registry database to serve its many social assistance programs.  Until that time, each program operated its 
own system for targeting beneficiaries (all via unverified means testing).
2  The creation of a unique database 
(the Cadastro Único, or Cadúnico) and social identification number (NIS) responded to the need to improve 
efficiency and coordination and reduce duplication of administrative costs across the numerous safety net 
programs.  
 
The main screening mechanism used with the Cadastro Único is unverified household incomes 
(unverified means testing).  Data collection and beneficiary registry are decentralized to the municipalities, 
but operation and maintenance of the database are centralized at the federal level, with oversight provided by 
the Ministry of Social Assistance (SEAS/SAPS), and system management and operation conducted by the 
Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF).
3   
 
There are several advantages to having a single national database for determining and monitoring 
eligibility for social transfer programs, including inter alia: (a) preventing or reducing duplication of benefits 
(e.g., people receiving benefits from more than one municipality or program); (b) reducing duplication of 
administrative costs across programs; and (c) monitoring time limits and graduation criteria.  The Cadastro 
Único represents a major step forward in advancing these goals.   
   7
Nonetheless, several aspects of the Cadastro Único should be improved, including: (a) clarifying its 
objectives; (b) distortions due to the use of a priori registry quotas; (c) distortions due to the use of self-
reported income for determining eligibility; (d) problems with the identification of households; (e) the static 
nature of the database; (f) the lack of a system for auditing and quality control; (g) a lack of data access by 
key potential users (programs, municipalities); and (h) software and implementation problems. 
 
Recommendations 
As discussed above, the introduction of the new Bolsa Família program offers an opportunity to 
revamp Brazil’s family registry and eligibility determination system so as to improve the targeting of social 
transfers.  International experience suggest that four features should be considered in developing an 
improved targeting system as an alternative to the existing system: 
 
•  Universal and on-going access to the registry for a dynamic safety net.  With this principle, 
the new system should avoid the static nature of the quota-based survey system: any family that 
believes it should be eligible for benefits should be allowed to apply for them at any time (even 
if they are not guaranteed benefits, pending an eligibility assessment), not just during survey 
periods.  The reformed system should also allow for on-going updates (demographic, locational) 
for those who do benefit.   
•  Cost Efficiency.  Efforts should be made to minimize the cost of interviewing families, while 
ensuring the integrity of intake efforts.  Although it is not possible to identify the poverty status 
of families a priori before interviews and data collection (and indeed, that was the problem with 
quota-based surveying under the current system), certain tools, such as self-selection 
mechanisms and geographic targeting, can help minimize the cost of interviewing large numbers 
of ineligible families.   
•  Outreach to the poor.  Specific efforts should also be made to ensure that the poor know of 
their potential eligibility for the program and can access the application and interview process.   
•  Transparency.  Procedures for both (a) entry into the registry (interviewing, registering); and 
(b) entry into the Bolsa Família program (eligibility criteria applied to data collected) should be 
fully transparent and based on objective, consistent criteria.   
Given these factors, we believe that improving the system for registering families and determining 
eligibility would result in considerable progress.  Specifically we suggest the following reforms: 
•  The process for determining entry into the new family registry should adopt a combined 
geographic and individual assessment mechanism whereby families are interviewed and 
registered either as part of a demand-driven application system (most areas) or as part of a 
survey-outreach effort (some very poor areas), depending on the poverty characteristics of the 
area in which they reside (from a poverty map). 
•  Once families are interviewed and registered, program eligibility should be determined by 
applying proxy-means points scoring methodologies to the data collected.  Program financing 
quotas should be used carefully and in a limited way. 
•  A system of regular audits, cross-checks and quality control is also recommended as part of a 
performance-based management system for the new family registry itself, and for the overall 
Bolsa Família program. 
•  Institutional responsibilities should also be clarified, both for levels of government and for 
specific agencies involved.   8
•  Finally, efforts should be made to invest in stronger implementation arrangements and to 
technically adjust to key features of the new Bolsa Família program.   
 
Since many of these reforms could take time, the report also suggests some transitional steps that 
could be taken to balance the need for moving fast to launch the Bolsa Família program, while taking the 
time needed to overhaul the family registry and eligibility process.  The note is not intended to provide a 
blueprint for reforms or transitional measures, but rather to highlight key features and considerations that we 
believe should be part of the reform of Brazil’s targeting system.   
 
By improving its mechanisms for targeting, Brazil will strengthen the poverty impact of the Bolsa Família 
program. This will further advance Brazil’s trademark as a world leader in social policy.  
 
Main Design Features of the Cadastro Único 
Target Population and Municipal Survey Quotas.  The design of the Cadúnico aimed at 
registering all “poor” families
4 whose income per capita was less than half a minimum wage
5 so as to 
facilitate their receipt of federal social benefits (the target group of most social assistance programs in 
Brazil).  Municipalities were given quotas for the total number of “poor” families to be registered in the 
database (whether or not the registered families later received benefits).  These quotas were based on 
municipal-level poverty estimates deriving from the 1991 census (with some updating from the 2000 census).  
As discussed below, the use of a priori quotas for determining which families to survey and register is not 
recommended and should be reconsidered.   
 
Questionnaire.  The Cadúnico questionnaire is a 13-page document (plus one page of general 
instructions).  Data collected include (a) identification numbers;
6 (b) household characteristics; (c) dwelling 
identification (address) and characteristics (tenure, type, total number of rooms, construction materials, water 
source and purification, type of lighting, sanitation, garbage collection); (d) incomes (see below); (d) 
expenses (rent, housing loans, food, water, electricity, transport, medicines, gas, and other expenditures); and 
(e) a variety of other information (land holdings, membership in social organizations, hired labor, and 
agricultural losses).  No data are collected on assets other than housing and land. 
 
Unverified Incomes as Targeting Instrument. Once data are collected, the various social programs 
use them to determine eligibility.  Income is the only variable collected in the Cadúnico questionnaire that is 
actually used to determine eligibility for most social assistance benefits.  The Cadúnico includes five income 
questions: earned income (from labor), retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, alimony, and other 
income.  In addition, the Cadúnico collects information on gross agricultural income
7 (covering the last 
“agricultural year”), which is included in eligibility calculations.  Income data are not verified by any form of 
documentation or cross-checking.  For example, although the existing Cadúnico questionnaire would allow 
for it, self-reported incomes are not cross-checked against expenditure information or housing characteristics 
to check for inconsistencies.  No instructions are given regarding: (a) which family members for which 
income data should be collected; (b) time reference periods (presumably quoted on a monthly basis by 
tradition in Brazil); (c) whether the income should be reported as average (monthly) or just the most recent 
unspecified time period (monthly); or (d) whether earned income should be reported as gross or net.  As 
discussed below, the use of unverified, self-reported incomes for eligibility and means-testing is generally 
not accurate and should be reconsidered.   
 
Uses.  Numerous social safety net programs use the Cadastro Único to some extent in selecting their 
beneficiaries.  The Bolsa Escola Program (BE), a conditional cash transfer program to promote school 
attendance, uses it to some extent, though not fully since it had already developed its own system for 
selecting beneficiaries (SIBES) before the Cadúnico was constructed.  As of March 2003, the BE program   9
made payments to about 4.6 million households (some from SIBES and some from Cadúnico).  The Bolsa 
Alimentação Program (BA), a conditional cash transfer program to promote health care and nutrition 
among young children and pregnant mothers, relies on the Cadúnico for selection of its beneficiaries.  As of 
March 2003, 894,000 households benefited from the BA program.
8   The Auxílio-Gas (a gas subsidy) and 
the Tarifa Social de Luz (an electricity subsidy) also use the Cadúnico database, though their beneficiary 
base is wider and they can include other households upon the provision of supporting information.  In 
practice, the regional utility companies report relying substantially on the Cadúnico for beneficiary selection.  
As of March 2003, 4.4 million households received the Auxílio Gas, or about 73% of total Cadúnico 
registrants.  The PETI (child labor) and Agente Jovem programs also rely on the Cadúnico for beneficiary 
selection (but also supplement additional criteria for eligibility).  Finally, the Fome Zero Cartão 
Alimentação program (which provides cash transfers to poor families provided they use the money for food 
purchases) has been using the Cadúnico as a first step for beneficiary selection.  The Cadúnico lists are then 
“validated” or modified (and updated) by municipal councils, which have the final decision for determining 
eligibility.  This has mostly led to excluding households which were included but do not meet the criteria.  In 
most cases, the registration of “new” households in the Cadúnico has not happened for lack of capacity to 
register them. 
Implementation of the Cadastro Único 
The implementation of the Cadastro Único is jointly the responsibility of municipalities and the CEF.  
The process can be divided into three broad steps (a)  data collection (decentralized, conducted by the 
municipalities); (b) data processing and database management (mainly conducted by the CEF in a centralized 
manner, building on information transferred from the municipalities); and (c) determining eligibility (federal 
and municipal program level) for the issuance of payments (centralized, see Box 1).    
Step 1:   Interviews and Household Registration in the Cadúnico   
Municipalities are responsible for the actual household registry process.  This process involves 
several steps: (1a) identifying which households to survey for the registry up to the pre-determined 
quota assigned to each municipality; (1b) setting up and training the interview team; (1c) conducting 
the interviews; and (1d) entering the data and transferring it to the CEF.   
 
(1a)   Identifying Households to be surveyed for the Registry.  As discussed above, each municipality 
receives an estimate of the number of poor families estimated to reside in their jurisdiction.  This 
estimate was derived from poverty analysis of (unverified) income data from the 1991 census, with 
some updating from information from the 2000 census.  The municipalities then use these estimates 
as “quotas” or goals for registration in their jurisdictions, making an a priori qualitative judgment 
about whether or not the households are “poor” and should be included in their “quota” for registry 
in the database.  Municipalities adopted their own methods for identifying a priori which households 
were “poor” enough to be registered in the Cadúnico.  In practice, such methods differed 
substantially across the country and sometimes within municipalities, with little uniformity or 
transparency.
9  Some municipalities
10 registered only those households that were already receiving a 
benefit from a social program.  Others excluded households who lacked formal documentation 
despite instructions that lack of documentation should not be a reason for exclusion.
11  A  f e w  
surveyed the entire population.
12  In addition, two types of households appear costly to register and 
seem to have been disproportionately excluded from the Cadastro: (a) those living in remote rural 
areas (land reform settlements, quilombolas) or islands in sparsely populated large area 
municipalities, especially in the Northern region; and (b)  those living in high-risk urban 
environments (favelas, squatter communities).
13     10
 
(1b)  Setting Up and Training Interview Teams.   Municipalities are responsible for setting up the 
interview teams.  In practice – and according to formal instructions – municipalities adopted a wide 
range of interviewers (“cadastradores”), including: municipal school teachers, community health 
workers, technical staff from the municipal secretariats for education, health and social assistance, 
coordinators and monitors for the Agente Jovem and PETI programs, partner NGOs, volunteers, 
university students, and trainees.
14  While some training was given,
15 in most cases, the training did 
not reach the actual interviewers, but included the social assistance secretary (very often, the 
municipal first lady) and sometimes the mayor, who were then supposed to “multiply” the training 
and extend it to interview teams.  This resulted in very heterogeneous training and quality of 
interviews.
16     
 
(1c)   Conducting the Interviews.  While formal Cadúnico instructions recommended home interviews 
and visits, the actual location of interviews varied widely, depending on the size of the municipality, 
whether it is urban or rural, and whether it had its own social assistance policy and programs.  In 
practice, labor constraints led municipalities to use a variety of strategies for conducting interviews.
17  
Municipalities that did not undertake home visits generally used some kind of outreach method.
18  
Instead of conducting new interviews, some municipalities that already had registries of their own 
tried transferring existing databases from local registries (e.g., São Paulo, Curitiba, Porto Alegre).  
As discussed below, this transfer was largely unsuccessful due to software and systems glitches.
19   
 
Box 1 – Simplified Flow Chart for Current Cadastro Único Roles and Key Steps 
Federal Government 
(MAPS) 
  Municipalities    Caixa Econômica 
Federal (CEF) 
  Federal Gov’t 
Line Ministries 
(Programs) 
• Provides Cadúnico 
Registry Quotas to 
Municipalities 
• Provides some 
training 




according to a 
priori quotas 
  • Develops & 
provides software, 




  • Verify 
beneficiary lists 
(MAPS for PETI 
and Agente 
Jovem, MEC for 
Bolsa Escola) 
 
    • Set up and 
train interview 
teams 
  • Receives and 
processes data 
• Assigns NIS 
• Manages Cadúnico 
database 






    • Conduct 
interviews 
  • Sends 
cryptographed 
return file to 
municipalities 





    • Enter and 
transfer data 
  • Sends beneficiary 
lists to Bolsa 
Escola (BE) 
• Sends raw data to 
BA/Fome Zero 




        • Issues payments to 
beneficiaries 
   
             
    Beneficiaries         
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Step 2:   Management of the Cadastro Único Database: Entering and Transferring Data   
Municipal Data Entry and Transfers.  The municipalities are responsible for entering the data
20 
and transferring
21 it to local CEF offices on diskettes or through the internet.  The Cadúnico system 
does not allow merging of databases so municipalities have to merge their database before 
transmitting it to the Caixa, a process that can last hours (and can be impossible for some large 
municipalities, who have had to re-enter their data).
22  Once the municipal files reach the CEF 
through one of the 15 servers, they are sent to the mainframe computer at the CEF.  After the CEF 
processes the data and assigns social identity numbers (see below), the CEF generates a 
cryptographed return file (“arquivo-retorno”), which is sent to the municipalities for review.   
Municipalities, however, cannot modify these data or correct errors.
23 
 
Identity Numbers and Duplications.   When the files are received, CEF assigns each person
24 a 
supposedly unique social identity number (NIS).  However, the TCU audit revealed that close to 
4,900 people (0.6%) of 864,101 audited registries
25 in the Cadúnico database had more than one NIS.  
Various factors cause these duplications: (a) input/typing errors in the field; (b) lack of coordination 
between municipal-level cadastro teams (possibly leading to, for example, two teams interviewing 
the same area twice), and (c) problems with the verification of identity.  Multiple NIS numbers for 
individuals can lead to duplication of payments, since the Cadúnico system would treat each NIS as a 
separate beneficiary.  In addition, the TCU audit found 458,751 cases (out of 17 million registries, or 
2.7%) in which people with a single NIS were registered more than once.  The analysis reveals that 
most of these (72%) were registered twice with different addresses, while the rest were registered 
twice with the same questionnaire.   
 
Database Management. The CEF did not pre-test the software and database for the Cadastro, and 
problems with data entry, transmission, and management of the Cadastro Único database abound, 
including:
26 
•  Unjustified exclusion of households.  Software glitches have resulted in the exclusion of 
households without clear reason (with up to 20% of applications being rejected).  In some cases, 
exclusion was linked to technical problems, such as: (a) data loss during batch transfers;
27 
(b) rejection of typographical characters (earlier versions of the data entry system had rejected 
some characters such as ç); (c) rejection of certain CPF numbers or postal codes starting with “0” 
(São Paulo); (d) exclusion of some households from utility subsidies due to a lack of NIS 
numbers in CEF-generated return files, which prevented eligibility from utility subsidies
28; and 
so forth.   
•  Inflexibility to incorporate changes.  To date, the current version of the Cadúnico software 
does not accept changes or updates in household files, such as the inclusion of new household 
members, registry of deaths, etc.  Indeed, the TCU audit revealed that deaths are not being taken 
out of the Cadastro Único.
29  The new version, 5.0, that is currently being introduced will 
apparently improve the ability of the Cadúnico to accept changes.  
•  Inefficient file transfers.  Information on numerous households from large urban centers (e.g., 
100,000 in São Paulo, 30,000 in Porto Alegre, etc.) was not included in the Cadastro Único due 
to problems with file transfers,
 30 and had to be re-entered.  The problems with merging and 
transferring files have still prevented Rio de Janeiro from including its information in the 
Cadastro, and Rio is now starting over in the collection of its Cadúnico data.   
 
Data Access.  Access to the Cadúnico database itself has been limited to the CEF and certain line 
ministries (e.g., Health for selection under the Bolsa Alimentação program).  The Ministry of Social 
Assistance is supposed to have access, but hardware and software limitations have prevented this. 
Municipalities and States have not had access to the data once it is processed by CEF.  Rather, 
municipalities only receive quantitative reports about the number of families in the system and the 
benefits they are receiving.  The magnetic data they do receive in the return files is cryptographed, so   12
that it is impossible for them to match back the Cadúnico data with their original files or own-
managed beneficiary databases.  The states do not receive any information.  The new version of the 
Cadúnico software apparently seeks to resolve the problems of municipal access to the data.  
Step 3: Determining Eligibility and Issuing Payments 
Each program has a different arrangement for using the Cadastro Único for determining eligibility.  
In some cases (e.g., Bolsa Escola), the CEF handles the whole process, running eligibility checks 
according to program criteria, and then informing the line ministry and municipalities about 
beneficiary lists.  In other cases (e.g., Bolsa Alimentação, Cartão Alimentação), the CEF provides 
the raw database to the line ministry to process eligibility decisions.  The line ministry then informs 
the CEF of the list of those eligible for payments.  In either case, once the CEF has the beneficiary 
list, it processes payments, which are issued to beneficiaries as magnetic benefit transfer cards.   
Magnitudes and Costs of the Cadastro Único 
Magnitude.  The Cadastro Único was implemented at amazing speed, beginning registration in mid-
2002 and reaching coverage of some 30 million people (7.3 million families) by August 2003 (just over a 
year later).  This compares with the initial national estimates of some 9-10 million poor families that should 
be registered.  Coverage and registration varies greatly by state.  With overall coverage of about 79% 
(families registered as a share of the total target population) as of August 2003, registration rates varied from 
only 2% in the Distrito Federal to 126% in Acre (some municipalities registered more than their assigned 
quota).   
 
Costs.   The costs of interviewing 
households for the Cadastro Único registry 
are estimated at US$28.5 million as of mid-
2003 (excluding “systems” costs, such as 
software, hardware, etc.).  While average 
unit costs clearly vary by area (according to 
population size, density, staffing, etc.), 
using these estimates, this implies an 
average cost of about US$3.9 per household 
registered.  This is slightly more expensive 
than the decentralized proxy means system 
operated in Colombia, but less expensive on 
a unit cost basis than similar systems operated in other LAC countries (Table 1).    As a share of 
total benefits transferred, the cost of the system represents about 1.6% of the total value of benefits 
transferred for various social programs using the Cadúnico (US$877 million).
31  This is more 
expensive per benefit transferred than systems in other LAC countries.   
Accuracy of the Cadastro Único and the Use of Unverified Incomes for 
Targeting 
The problems with collecting data on incomes in household surveys are well known.  Incomes tend 
to be underreported and incompletely measured, due to earnings in-kind or informal earnings.  Incomes also 
fluctuate over a year due to seasonality and other shocks (particularly for those in the informal sector, the 
self-employed or those engaged in agriculture), such that monthly reference periods are unlikely to 
accurately represent a household’s total income or welfare.  These problems are illustrated in Table 2, which 
presents data from the Living Standards Measurement Survey (PPV) with the 1996 Household Income 
Table 1 – Comparisons of Interview Costs for 
Cadastros, LAC 






















Source: Castañeda, Tarsicio, Kathy Lindert, and Luisa Fernandez 
(September 2003).  Costs only include the local costs of interviewing 
(not systems costs).     13
Survey (PNAD, 1996).  Data on income from the PPV, which come from a very thorough and detailed set of 
questions, are higher than those of consumption, as would be expected due to savings.  Data on income from 
the more standard – and far less detailed – questions on income in the PNAD, however, are far lower than 
consumption, demonstrating the problems with underestimation of income in household surveys.  For these 
reasons, data on consumption are generally believed to provide a more accurate picture of a household’s 
welfare (more comprehensive, less likely to be under-reported, less variable).   
 
Table 2 – Underestimation of Income in Household Surveys 
Median monthly per capita income and consumption, 1996 Reals 
  PPV 
Consumption 
PPV Income  PNAD Income  PNAD income/ 
PPV consump. 
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Source: World Bank (analysis by Peter Lanjouw, 2003). 
 
These standard measurement problems are compounded when income data is being collected for the 
known purpose of determining benefit eligibility.  When households know that the answers they provide 
about their incomes will influence whether or not they would receive benefits, they have an added incentive 
to under-report their incomes.
32   
 
All of these problems are present in the collection of unverified income data for the Cadastro Único.  
First, the Cadúnico questionnaire does not include a very complete set of questions regarding income
33 
leading to a likely underestimation of incomes.  Second, reference periods for incomes in the Cadúnico are 
not specified (which itself can lead to significant error), but are assumed to be monthly (which suffer from 
the income fluctuation issues described above).  Third, unlike with household surveys, with the Cadastro 
Único, households have the rational incentive to under-report income data provided since they know that the 
answers they provide will determine whether or not they are to receive benefits from a variety of social 
programs.  Fourth, there are no verifications of the self-reported income data provided (which could have 
helped reduce simple measurement errors and adverse incentives for under-reporting).  Data are not regularly 
cross-checked, either (a) within the Cadastro Único (e.g., checking reported incomes against reported 
expenditure data or housing quality variables, and then following up with re-interviews to reconcile 
inconsistencies); or (b) between the Cadastro Único and other databases (such as INSS, death databases, 
etc.).  There is also no permanent system for regularly auditing the quality of the Cadastro Único (the TCU 
audit being conducted as a one-time quality audit).  Finally, there are no penalties for fraud or abuse, and, as 
such, no real incentives against under-reporting of incomes.   
 
At present, comprehensive and nationally-representative data on the distributional incidence of 
transfers targeted using the Cadastro Único are not available.  The PNAD surveys do not collect detailed 
information on the main social assistance programs that rely on the Cadúnico to determine eligibility (e.g., 
Bolsa Escola, Cartão Alimentação, Bolsa Alimentação, Auxílio Gas, etc.).  As such, there is no clear 
independent evaluation of the actual coverage or distribution of such benefits across the poor and non-poor 
(or quintiles) to determine errors of exclusion and inclusion, or gaps and duplications in coverage.  A new 
household budget survey (the “POF”) that was just completed, however, will provide the first opportunity to 
conduct such an analysis since its questionnaires did include specific questions about receipt of benefits from 
these programs.   
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Nonetheless, available evidence does suggest that the use of unverified incomes in the Cadastro Único is 
in accurate and should not be used for targeting cash transfers: 
•  PNAD vs. Cadastros: The Adverse Effect of Incentives.  A comparison of the results from the 
PNAD survey and households included in the Cadastro Único and SIBES (the registry used by 
Bolsa Escola prior to the introduction of the Cadastro Único) reveals important differences in the 
number of poor households (Table 3).  The PNAD survey likewise collects (self-reported) data on 
household incomes (with somewhat more detailed questions and without the adverse incentives for 
households to underreport income since no benefits are attached to the PNAD survey).  Nonetheless, 
this comparison reveals over a million additional “poor” households included in the Cadastros 
(Cadúnico + SIBES) as compared with estimates from the PNAD.  The tendency for households to 
underestimate incomes appears particularly strong among the “extreme poor:” almost twice as many 
extreme poor households (close to five million more) are identified by the Cadastros as compared 
with the PNAD.  (Moreover, these results occur before the completion of registries for the Cadastro 
in various states). 
•  INSS database vs. Cadastro Único.  The TCU audit linked the Cadúnico database to the benefits 
database of the National Social Security Institute (INSS) for Rio Grande do Norte using CPF data.  
The match showed that, out of 1,914 households, 652 reported lower incomes in the Cadúnico form 
than for INSS (34%), with a resulting inclusion of 228 non-eligible households (12% of the total 
included).   
 
Table 3 – Tendency for Underreporting of Incomes in Cadastros  
that Use Unverified Incomes as Tool for Determining Eligibility for Social Programs 
Total # of Households (mn) with Reported HH income per capita of:   
 
# “poor” households (mn) from: 




Less than R$100 
(Poor) 
From PNAD 2001  5.1  6.3  11.4 
Total from Cadastros: 
    From Cadastro Único 
•  With BE or BA benefits 
•  Without BE or BA 
















Source: de la Briere, Benedicte, Claudio Roquete, et. al. (August 2003).  *SIBES is a registry similar to the Cadastro Único 
that was developed and put into use by the Bolsa Escola (BE) program before the introduction of the Cadúnico.  It also uses 
unverified income as the main screening device for determining eligibility.   
 
The problems associated with the use of unverified incomes as a targeting mechanism compound the 
other errors arising from the design and implementation of the Cadastro Único (e.g., people with duplicate 
i.d. numbers and/or registries in the Cadastro, the inclusion of dead people, the exclusion of potentially 
eligible families due to the application of a priori quotas or data errors, etc.), as discussed above. 
Main Issues and Recommendations 
Advantages 
Transfer programs like the new Bolsa Família program require some type of targeting mechanism to 
ensure that their resources go to the poor as intended.  The rationale for targeting rests on the simple premise 
that the social returns for a given unit of transfer differ across members of society.
34  Rather than granting 
transfers to all individuals regardless of need, targeted programs concentrate limited public expenditures on 
those who need them most.  Targeting cash transfers requires some mechanism for selecting specific 
beneficiaries (individuals or households).  This usually involves collecting data on households (either 
incomes or “proxy” characteristics that are associated with poverty) and then determining eligibility by 
comparing these data to certain eligibility thresholds.     15
 
There are several advantages to having a single national database for determining and monitoring 
eligibility for social transfer programs, including inter alia: (a) preventing or reducing duplication of benefits 
(e.g., people receiving benefits from more than one municipality or program); (b) reducing duplication of 
administrative costs across programs; and (c) monitoring time limits and graduation criteria.  The Cadastro 
Único represents a major step forward in advancing these goals.   
 
The Cadastro Único experience also adopts several positive features.  Broadly speaking, the reliance 
on (a) municipalities to collect and enter the data (implementation); and (b) a central body to manage the 
database and a single software, seems appropriate given the size and governmental structure of the country.  
The attempt to generate a single identification number is also commendable.  In addition, the collection of a 
broader set of welfare measures (e.g., expenditure data, housing information in addition to welfare) could 
provide useful tools for cross-checking income measures (though these were not used).  Finally, the sheer 
speed in which the database was launched and implemented is indeed impressive. 
 
Issues 
Nonetheless, there are several aspects of the Cadastro that should be improved, including: 
•  A Need to Clarify Objectives.  The current design of the Cadúnico neither serves the objectives 
of (a) creating a single beneficiary registry, since many households benefit from programs but 
are not in the Cadúnico (e.g., those in SIBES for Bolsa Escola); or (b) operating as a targeting 
tool for determining eligibility (due to the imposition of a priori registration quotas, which, as 
discussed below, should be abandoned).  The first order of discussion should be to clarify what it 
is that such a cadastro should do.  Ideally, the government would possess an effective instrument 
for targeting and determining eligibility for benefits of existing programs or the new integrated 
Bolsa Família program.  Two key design features should be reconsidered for the creation of an 
effective targeting tool: (a) the way in which households are interviewed and registered (entry 
into the registry); and (b) the process for determining eligibility using the data collected (entry 
into the program).  These are each discussed below.  The national database that would be 
constructed as a result of these interviews and data collection exercises could also serve as a 
beneficiary registry.  This role, however would be a secondary, implicit objective that would 
come after eligibility determination is conducted (with some subset of households in the 
database that receive benefits after eligibility criteria have been applied).   
•  Distortions Due to the Use of A Priori Registry Quotas.  An important design flaw for the 
Cadastro Único is the imposition of municipal level quotas for registering households.  These 
quotas result in excluding potentially poor or including potentially non-poor households before 
the appropriate information is collected or eligibility guidelines are applied.  Decisions about 
whether or not to register (interview) households are being taken without clear federal 
guidelines. Although the federal government provided guidelines about the headcount number of 
poor families to register, it did not provide guidelines about where and how to identify them.  
There are several possible problems with quota-based surveying and interviews: (a)  lack of 
transparency regarding which households get interviewed; (b)  opportunities for political 
manipulation (e.g., vote seeking by registering certain households with particular political 
affiliations rather than those without such affiliations); and (c)   the potential for replicating 
existing inequalities at the local level (e.g., where the extreme poor get excluded because they 
are less informed or less connected to be included in the quota of registrants).  For these reasons, 
the use of these a priori registration quotas should be abandoned, as discussed below.   
•  Use of Self-Reported Income for Determining Eligibility.   As discussed above, the use of 
unverified incomes for targeting is generally problematic due to measurement errors and 
incentives for under-reporting and manipulation.
35  The experience with Brazil’s Cadastro Único   16
is no exception.  The income questions were poorly defined (reference periods, coverage of types 
of income), and, without any form of verification, there is simply too much room for error and 
under-reporting to rely on these data.  Available evidence is discussed above.  Alternatives are 
discussed below.   
•  Static Database.  The Cadúnico is a static database.  It does not allow households who become 
poor after their municipality has conducted surveys to enter the rolls.  It does not allow for 
updating and changes of information on households that are included in the registry, e.g., for 
deaths, household composition changes, or changes in incomes (short of a complete re-
surveying).   
•  Lack of auditing and quality control.  At present, the Cadastro Único does not have a regular 
audit and quality control system to monitor its performance.  The TCU audit was conducted as a 
one-time evaluation, and was not part of a broader system.  Such a system is greatly needed.   
•  Problems with Identification.  Numerous problems have arisen with the identification of 
individuals.  First, some households were excluded due to lack of documentation to prove their 
identity.  Second, inconsistent information on names was collected.  Third, some households 
have duplicate NIS numbers or are registered more than once – which could lead to duplicate 
payments.   
•  Lack of Data Access.  Another deficiency with the Cadastro Único is the lack of access to the 
database by municipalities and states.   
•  Other software and implementation problems.  As discussed above, the Cadúnico’s software 
has many weaknesses (households dropped in merging and transferring of files, inability to 
change records, various other errors).  It also fails to include basic cross-checks (duplicate NIS, 
duplicate registration of households, cross-checking variables such as household expenses or 
housing quality against reported incomes, cross-checking against other databases, identifying 
registrants who have died, etc.) that would improve its accuracy.  Other weaknesses with the 
Cadastro Único include: inadequate training and staffing of local interview teams, illogical 
questionnaire structure (mixing family-level and individual-level questions), and imprecise 
questionnaire definition (e.g., reference periods and other needed instructions).   
Recommendations   
The launching of the integrated Bolsa Família program provides Brazil with a historic opportunity to 
reduce poverty and inequality.  These objectives depend crucially upon an effective mechanism for 
channeling benefits to the poor.  As such, the new program also provides an opportunity for the Government 
to revamp the Cadastro Único into a more modern, cost-effective, and accurate targeting tool.  Fixing the 
cadastro is needed to promote better targeting and to ensure the effectiveness of the Bolsa Família program.   
 
While this note is not intended to provide a detailed blueprint for reforms, it provides a general road 
map to key recommendations that should be considered in re-thinking the design and implementation of an 
improved Cadastro Único (or some replacement for it).   The main recommendations adopt a longer-term 
vision, recommending the type of system that we recommend Brazil move towards for the future.  Since the 
development of such a system will likely take time, we also include some recommendations about managing 
the transition in a subsequent section of the paper.  The specific details regarding reforms for both the 
immediate and the long-run should build on consultations with different types of municipalities (large urban 
centers, small rural villages), program managers at local and central levels, CEF agencies, etc. so as to build 
on their experience with the Cadúnico as well as that of other (central or local) registries.   
 
International experience suggests that four features should be considered in developing an improved 
targeting system as an alternative to the existing quota-based survey system:   17
•  Universal and on-going access to the registry for a dynamic safety net.  With this principle, 
the new system should avoid the static nature of the existing quota-based survey system: any 
family that believes it should be eligible for benefits should be allowed to apply for them at any 
time (even if they are not guaranteed to benefit, pending an eligibility assessment), not just 
during certain infrequent survey periods.  The reformed system should also allow for on-going 
updates (demographic, locational) for those who do benefit.   
•  Cost Efficiency.  Efforts should be made to minimize the cost of interviewing families, while 
ensuring the integrity of intake efforts.  Although it is not possible to identify the poverty status 
of families a priori before interviews and data collection (and indeed, that was the problem with 
quota-based surveying under the current system), certain tools, such as self-selection 
mechanisms and geographic targeting, can help minimize the cost of interviewing large numbers 
of ineligible families.   
•  Outreach to the poor.  Specific efforts should also be made to ensure that the poor know of 
their potential eligibility for the program and can access the application and interview process.   
•  Transparency.  Procedures for both (a) entry into the registry (interviewing, registering); and 
(b) entry into the Bolsa Família program (eligibility criteria applied to data collected) should be 
fully transparent and based on objective, consistent criteria.   
 
Given these factors, we believe that improving the system for registering families and determining 
eligibility would result in considerable progress.  With respect to entry into the new family registry, we 
recommend a combined geographic and individual assessment mechanism in which families are interviewed 
and registered either as part of a demand-driven application system (most areas) or as part of a survey-
outreach effort (some very poor areas), depending on the poverty characteristics of the areas in which they 
reside (from a poverty map).  Once families are registered into the Family Registry, we then recommend that 
program eligibility be determined by applying proxy-means points scoring methodologies to the data 
collected.  We also recommend only limited and careful use of program financing quotas.  A system of 
regular audits, cross-checks and quality control is also recommended as part of a performance-based 
management approach to the new family registry itself and to the overall Bolsa Família program.   
Institutional responsibilities should also be clarified.  Finally, efforts should be made to invest in stronger 
implementation arrangements and technically adjust to key features of the new Bolsa Família program.  Each 
of these recommendations is discussed in further detail below, followed by a brief discussion of key 
transition issues.  
 
(1)  Entry into the Family Registry 
 
In light of the four key features discussed above – universal and on-going access, cost efficiency, 
outreach to the poor, and transparency – we recommend that the process for interviewing and registering 
families for subsequent eligibility consideration be conducted in two steps: (a)  using a detailed and 
disaggregated poverty map to help target the program geographically; and (b) developing an on-demand 
application process as the main instrument for registering families, but combined with a survey-based 
approach in a few exceptional cases.   
 
Geographic Targeting with a Poverty Map.  A detailed, disaggregated poverty map can be used to 
help determine the process by which families are registered.  For example, in a high poverty density area 
(e.g., highly-poor urban area with poverty rates greater than  70-80%), registering all families makes sense 
since most would ultimately be eligible for program benefits (virtually universal eligibility within that 
geographic micro-area).  In contrast, in areas with lower poverty rates, the use of an on-demand application 
process makes more sense.  In these areas, many families would not be ultimately eligible for program 
benefits, and as such would be more likely to self-select out of the registry if they know they have to stand in 
line with much poorer individuals and bear the indirect costs of the application process (i.e., their time).  As   18
such, a detailed and disaggregated poverty map can help provide guidelines as to which areas should adopt 
which type of family registry process.   
 
The first step in redesigning Brazil’s targeting mechanisms, therefore, would be the use or 
construction of a disaggregated poverty map.  While some proxy-based poverty maps exist (e.g., maps of 
weighted human development indicators), IBGE and the World Bank are starting up work on the 
construction of a poverty map that combines data from the 2000 census and the 2003 household budget 
survey (POF).
36  This methodology for constructing poverty maps has many advantages, including statistical 
accuracy, a fairly detailed level of geographic disaggregation (municipal or lower), and the generation of 
detailed indicators of poverty (rates, severity, depth) and inequality that can be used in helping characterize 
areas for the purposes of targeting.  The construction of this new poverty map is estimated to take between 3-
8 months, depending on the readiness of the data, the availability of staff and facilities (including space and 
computers) for the work.  Other proxy poverty maps (using proxies from the census or the atlas of human 
development indicators) could be used in the interim if needed.   
 
Registry and Interviewing of Families.  The second step in redesigning Brazil’s targeting 
mechanisms would be to interview and register specific families into the revised Family Registry.  Two 
approaches are generally used for this: (a) an on-demand application method, whereby families come apply 
for inclusion in the registry; and (b) a survey-outreach method, whereby all families in a particular area are 
registered.  Based on international experience, there are advantages and disadvantages of each method, and 
situations in which each are more suitable (Table 4).   In light of these, we recommend a mixed approach, 
building on a geographic categorization of areas based on the poverty map (Table 5): 
 
•  On-Demand Application Process as the Principle.  In most areas (as determined by the 
poverty map), we recommend the use of a demand-driven application process for both the 
immediate term and the long run (Table 5).  With this approach, families would come to local 
welfare offices to apply for inclusion in the registry (and consideration for benefits).  Initial 
interviews would collect basic information (residence, household composition, some basic proxy 
welfare indicators, see below).  Follow-up home visits would verify this information (within a 
maximum period of time, say 30 days, to ensure efficiency of performance).  These home visits 
could be unannounced so as to discourage manipulation (e.g., hiding of assets, as discussed 
below).  To help spread out the possible bunching of initial applications and ease staffing 
constraints, registration “seasons” or waves could be announced (e.g., alphabetically).  With this 
approach, families that are unlikely to be eligible for program benefits (e.g., the non-poor) would 
be more likely to self-select out of the registry to avoid having to line up with those poorer than 
themselves or bearing the indirect time costs of registering.  Even with the on-demand approach, 
we recommend that Brazil adopt measures to actively promote applications by the poor (see 
Table 5).   
•  Survey-Outreach Method in Very Poor Areas.  With pure geographic targeting, all families in 
very poor micro-areas would be eligible for a benefit (e.g., extreme poverty rates > 70%) 
because the administrative cost of identifying and excluding the few non-poor families would 
outweigh the benefits from doing so (savings on transfer leakages).  However, the operation of 
cash transfer programs requires the registration of families even in extremely poor micro-areas, 
where virtually all households would presumably be eligible.  At a very minimum, families must 
be registered and residence and identity verified.  Registration information is needed to later 
process and issue payments, and verifications are needed to prevent against fraud, false 
addresses, ghost beneficiaries, and/or people coming from other areas to claim benefits.  As 
such, even in very poor areas, we recommend at least an initial surveying-outreach approach, 
whereby all families in those micro-areas are registered, with verifications performed on 
residence and identity (Table 5).  Since verification of residence and identity (usually about 10 
questions) would generally require a home visit,
37 and since the marginal cost of gathering   19
additional basic proxy welfare information (usually about 10 questions) is relatively small once a 
home visit is already being conducted, this outreach-surveying would involve basic registration, 
verification of identity and residence, and the collection of basic proxy welfare indicators (see 
below).  In some areas – such as high density poor areas – such outreach-surveying might only 
be needed in an initial stage (to reduce the unit costs of registering large numbers of neighboring 
families).  After that initial sweep, these areas would revert to the development of a permanent 
on-demand application process, perhaps using satellite or mobile welfare offices located in these 
very poor micro-areas (Table 5).  In other areas – such as highly poor remote rural areas – 
outreach surveying may be needed on a repeated basis due to the dispersed location of poor 
families and the higher likelihood that they would be uninformed or unable to travel the needed 
distances to apply.   
 
Table 4 - Advantages and Disadvantages of Outreach and Application Registry Methods 
The Survey-Outreach Method: Survey of Poor Areas  On-Demand Application Method 
Advantages 
•  Better chances of reaching the poorest of poor who 
can be uninformed about programs and or have no 
money for transport, other, to apply for programs; 
•  Marginal unit costs of registry are lower (since a 
census-like operation that covers neighboring families 
can save in transport and other costs) 
•  Can contribute to better data quality control and 
reduce manipulation of data 
Advantages 
•  Self-selection of non-poor families out of registry 
(declining to apply) may result in lower total costs due to 
lower number of families interviewed 
•  Dynamic (not static) database that is easier (cheaper) to 
manage and update and that allows on-going access to 
registry (more flexible as a safety net tool) 
•  More transparent and open: anyone has the right to be 
interviewed upon application.   
•  Permanent process helps build and maintain institutional 
structures and capacities (rather than infrequent use of 
survey teams) 
•  Increasing institutional capacity can eventually allow for 
use of “one-stop shops” whereby in-take specialists can also 
refer applicants to other social services 
Disadvantages 
•  Total cost of registry many be higher, especially if 
survey covers many non-eligible non-poor families 
•  Static database that is difficult to update, manage and 
that can deny on-going (permanent) access to registry 
(between survey updates) 
•  Quota-based (rather than exhaustive) surveying 
results in non-transparent decisions being made about 
which families get registered before data are collected 
Disadvantages 
•  Those that apply may not be the poorest (may live closer 
to urban areas, be more informed, have higher education 
and or have money for transport costs, etc.); 
•  May exclude the poorest of the poor who are less 
informed or face higher transport costs 
•  Per unit costs are higher (repeated travel costs of making 
separate and repeated home visits in specific neighborhoods 
as families apply), there are problems with locating 
addresses of poor. 
Best suited when: 
•  Poverty levels are high (over 70%), poverty areas are 
homogeneous (rural areas, urban slums), low average 
education levels 
•  There is a need to start a large program quickly and 
government needs to be pro-active in reaching poorest.  
Best suited when: 
•  Poverty levels are moderate or low, and areas are 
heterogeneous; 
•  People have higher education levels and outreach 
campaigns to encourage program participation can be 
implemented.  
Examples of Use: 
•  Colombia’s SISBEN (exhaustive census-surveying of 
pre-identified poor areas) 
•  Brazil’s Cadastro Único (quota-based surveying) 
•  Chile’s Ficha CAS until the early 1990s 
•  Mexico (Progresa Program) in poor, rural areas 
•  Costa Rica (surveying of poor areas) 
Examples of Use: 
•  The United States 
•  Chile’s Ficha CAS since the early 1990s 
•  Mexico (Progresa Program) in urban areas 
•  Costa Rica (also available on demand) 
•  Colombia (also available on demand) 
Source: Castañeda, Tarsicio, Kathy Lindert and Luisa Fernandez (2003, forthcoming).  
  
Table 5 – Combining Geographic Targeting and Individual Assessment Mechanisms for Family Registry (Intake) 
Application and Registry Process  Geographic Targeting 
Category (from 
disaggregated poverty map) 
Implications and Factors to 
Consider  INITIAL START-UP  PERMANENT 
Promotion and Outreach 
Methods 
Heterogeneous areas: 
•  Medium- or lower-poverty 
rates (<70%); 
•  High inequality 
(Most areas) 
•  Many families will not be 
poor 
•  Need to avoid costs of 
interviewing large numbers 
of non-poor 
•  Need to make program 
available to those that are 
poor 
INITIAL AND PERMANENT: 
 
Demand-driven application process: candidates must come in to 
local welfare offices to apply; unannounced home visits follow initial 
interview (to verify residence, identity, welfare indicators).  
 
Regular (annual?) re-certification by those that receive benefits 
required.   
•  Public information campaign 
•  Access via main local welfare 
office (self-selection for 
applications) 
Areas with very high 
poverty density: 
•  High poverty rate (>70-
80%), and  
•  Large number of poor 
people per km 
(e.g., high poverty urban 
areas) 
•  Most families will be poor 
•  Still need to register them 
and verify residence, 
identity 
•  Large concentration 
(density) of poor people 
reduces unit costs of 
interviewing and registering 
Initial survey-outreach sweep, 
registering all families within that 
geographic area into database. 
 
Could rely on existing Cadastro if 
completed, but may need 
updating.  If do use existing 
Cadastro temporarily, could also 
allow those who were not 
included to go to local welfare 
offices to apply. 
Permanent demand-driven 
application process: 
Candidates must come to local 
welfare offices to fill out basic 
application form and conduct 
initial interview (basic registry 
information).  Home visit 
would follow to verify 
residence, household 
composition, and welfare 
indicators (marginal cost of 
latter is small once home visit 
already being conducted) 
 
Regular (annual?) re-
certification by those that 
receive benefits required. 
•  Public information campaign  
•  Initial survey sweep 
•  Satellite or mobile registry 
offices located in these areas 
•  Candidates could also go to 
the main local welfare office 
Areas with high but 
dispersed poverty: 
•  high poverty rate (>70-
80%), but  
•  low density  
(e.g., very poor remote, rural 
areas) 
•  Most families will be poor 
•  Still need to register them 
and verify residence, 
identity 
•  Dispersion of poor families 
(and likely remote 
locations) raises unit costs 
of interviewing and 
registering 
Initial survey-outreach sweep, 
registering all families within that 
geographic area into database. 
 
Could rely on existing Cadastro if 
completed, but may need 
updating.  If do use existing 
Cadastro temporarily, could also 
allow those who were not 
included to go to local welfare 
offices to apply. 
Permanent process of 
repeated survey sweeps using 
mobile unit and 
institutionalized teams due to 
high unit costs of each separate 
interview (economies of scale 
with survey sweep approach) 
 
Potentially eligible families can 
also come to nearest welfare 
office to apply at any time to 
guarantee open access between 
sweeps 
•  Public information campaign  
•  Initial survey sweep 
•  Repeated survey sweeps with 
mobile units and 
institutionalized teams 
•  Candidates could also go to 
the nearest main local welfare 
office 
  
(2)  Using Proxy Means Indicators to Determine Program Eligibility   
 
As discussed above, the use of unverified incomes for targeting is generally problematic due to 
measurement errors and incentives for under-reporting and manipulation, both internationally and in Brazil.
38  
If incomes cannot be verified in a cost-efficient manner (as is likely to be the case in Brazil, with its high 
degree of informality and in-kind earnings), then Brazil should instead use proxy means variables as a tool 
for targeting social programs to the poor.    
 
Proxy-means tests use a relatively small number of household characteristics to calculate a score that 
indicates how well off the family is (providing an estimate of its “probability of being poor”).  These 
characteristics should ideally be easily observed, but not easily manipulated by families, and they should 
generally be correlated with overall welfare.  Typical variables used in other countries include: geographic 
location, housing quality, ownership of durables, education of adults, availability of public infrastructure 
services, and employment.  Some countries also use self-reported income along with these other variables (so 
that the other variables provide a sort of “cross-check” to help with the consistency of reporting).  Locality-
level poverty rates can also be used as one of the “proxies,” reflecting the probability that the family is poor 
due to its location in a particular micro-area.
39 
 
The proxy-means variables are then weighted using statistical techniques to generate an overall 
points score.
40  Those families with scores below certain thresholds are then eligible for benefits.  Proxy 
means tests are generally better at accurately identifying those living in long-term, chronic poverty than those 
whose situations have recently worsened due to shocks (transient poor).   
 
Proxy means testing is currently being used in a number of countries with relatively strong results.
41  
For example, under Chile’s Subsidio Único Famíliar (SUF), a cash transfer targeted to poor families using 
Chile’s Ficha CAS (proxy means testing system), close to 90% of total benefits transferred are received by 
those in the poorest 40% of the population (and two thirds go to the bottom quintile).  With Colombia’s 
scholarship program, which is targeted using its proxy means testing system (SISBEN), close to three 
quarters of all benefits go to those in the poorest 40% of the population.  Moreover, proxy means testing is 
generally not expensive (see Table 1 above), averaging about US$5.9 per interview in Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Mexico. 
 
In switching to a proxy-means based system, policymakers should carefully consider which variables 
should be included (based on poverty analysis of household surveys), avoiding the inclusion of unnecessary 
information (which is costly to collect).  Moreover, policymakers should adopt measures to reduce the risk of 
manipulation, such as by re-weighting the points scoring formula from time to time, or using unannounced 
home visits (so that households couldn’t try to hide their assets in advance).   
 
Since most variables used for proxy means testing change more slowly than incomes (measuring 
primarily chronic, not transient, poverty) updating and re-certification of beneficiaries can be less frequent 
than with incomes (say every two years).  Decisions should also be taken about lifetime time limits or 
graduation periods to be applied to the Bolsa Família program. 
 
(3)  Careful Application of Quotas for Program Eligibility – Only If Needed 
 
Ideally, the Bolsa Família (or other social assistance programs) would be available to anyone at any 
time provided that they are poor (meet proxy-means eligibility criteria as applied to data collected in the 
revised Family Registry) and comply with the required conditionalities (for health and education).  This open 
safety net would imply that anyone could apply at any time (not a static database) – but also that the budget 
be open and counter-cyclical (to allow for changing numbers of beneficiaries).  Often, fiscal limitations 
constrain such flexibility in the safety net and force policymakers to impose quotas on the total number of   22
families eligible for benefits.  Quotas for program eligibility are not the same as quotas for interviewing and 
registering families (which should not be used, as discussed above).  If needed, quotas for program eligibility 
should be carefully implemented.  Again, the poverty map can be a useful tool, determining the amount of 
financial allocations (quotas) assigned to each municipality for the transfer program according to transparent 
poverty-based criteria.  Within municipalities, officials should adopt transparent criteria for determining 
which of the potentially eligible families would benefit.  Preference should be given to the extreme poor 
before the moderate poor.  After that, other criteria – such as presence of young children, recent death in a 
family, or evidence of other shocks – could be used to prioritize families.  If no such criteria are feasibly 
available, at the very least a fair, random, and transparently publicized “lottery” system could be used to 
allocate available program slots among (surveyed and registered) eligible families in the (revised) cadastro.  
For example, the computer could select every X number of families to be eligible (and this transparent 
criteria is published so as to be understood by the public).  This would avoid the application of other – non-
transparent (political) – criteria from entering the decision process.   
 
(4)  Developing a System of Regular Audits, Cross-Checks, Quality Control   
 
An improved targeting system should also include clear guidelines for regular independent audits, 
cross-checks and quality control.  First, regular random audits should review application procedures and 
database management for a random sample of families (up to 20% resurvey).  This is critical to ensuring 
objective and transparent treatment of all citizens by reducing opportunities for manipulation and favoritism 
in the selection of beneficiaries.  Clear procedures should be established (and published) for punishing fraud.  
Second, the improved system should also build in regular cross-checks to avoid some of the errors that have 
plagued the existing Cadastro, such as duplication of beneficiaries (NIS and multiple entries), “ghost 
beneficiaries” (missing or dead beneficiaries), or “lost candidates” whose data get lost during file transfers.  
Finally, independent quality control is also needed to measure how well the beneficiary selection mechanism 
(improved Cadastro Único) is actually working in terms of avoiding errors of exclusion of the poor and 
inclusion of the non-poor.  This can be done by including questions about receipt of programs that use the 
Cadastro Único – especially the new Bolsa Família program – in regular nationally, representative surveys 
(such as the PNAD, the PME and the POF surveys).   This information would provide regular feedback about 
the actual targeting outcomes of these programs – and the accuracy of the targeting instrument.  Such surveys 
and random sampling could also be done at a sub-national level, to provide feedback to specific states (and 
possibly municipalities) about the accuracy of the application of the targeting instrument within their 
jurisdictions.   
 
(5)  Performance-Based Management and Targeting Outcomes   
 
A few key indicators should be used to track the performance of the Cadastro Único, and the 
programs (such as Bolsa Família) that use it.  These include: (a) indicators of targeting outcomes (coverage 
of the poor, program incidence, errors of inclusion and exclusion); and (b) poverty reduction.  As discussed 
above, these performance and quality control indicators could be tracked using household surveys and 
random sample audits, conducted by an independent body.  To provide incentives for accurate application of 
targeting instruments, these results could be published openly.  Further incentives could be built in to the 
system by providing small but symbolic financial rewards to municipalities (or states) that are revealed (by 
independent surveys) to generate strong targeting outcomes.  Some key interim process indicators could also 
be tracked as a monitoring function, such as municipalities’ performance on outreach, updating, etc.  
 
(6)  Clarify Definition of Institutional Responsibilities   
 
There is a need to define clear responsibilities of the different agencies involved including 
identifying: (a) who is responsible for building and operating the system and updating it; (b) how often 
updates will be required; (c)  who supervises application and updates; (d)  who provides financing for 
application and updates; (e)  how often and how the database will be supplied to program agencies,   23
municipalities, and other users; (f) how and through what channels program agencies can provide feedback 
to system administrators.  Adequate financing should also be provided for the redesign and implementation 
of an improved Cadastro, both at the central level and at the municipal level (preferably financed with federal 
funds).   
 
Broadly speaking, the use of municipalities for implementation and data collection, states for 
consolidating information (could be optional), and a central agency for database management and central 
guidelines seems appropriate.  One possible general configuration of roles for the family registry by level of 
agency (central, state/region, or local/municipal) is included in Box 2.  (Note that these outline possible roles 
for the family registry, not for the entire Bolsa Familia program or the monitoring of conditionalities, which 
should be the responsibility of the line ministries). 
 
Box 2 - Simplified Possible Division of Roles for Family Registry by Government Level 
 






























However, the specific agencies, and their roles, should be reviewed and clarified.  For example, it 
may be decided that the CEF’s role should focus primarily on issuance of NIS numbers and payments, with 
another central agency be responsible for managing the database.  Applying eligibility criteria and managing 
beneficiary lists should be the responsibility of program managers in the new Executive Secretariat and 
monitoring of conditionalities should be the responsibility of the line ministries, provided that this 
information get fed back to a central body overseeing the issuance of payments.   
-Poverty Mapping 
-Det. Variables & Weights 
- Questionnaires, manuals 
- Guidelines for registry 
procedures 
- Application software
- Data collection by 
application or survey 
approach 
- Data entry 
- Data processing and 
cleaning 
- Frequent updates 
- Corrections 
- Tech. assistance to municipalities 
- IT support 
_____________________________ 
- Random data audits, quality cont.* 
- Data consolidation State level  
- Data crossings/Cleaning State level 
- Random data audits, 
quality & fraud control* 
- Data consolidation 
federal level 
- Data encryption 
-Master Federal Data Base 
- Selection of beneficiaries federal 
programs (Bolsa Familia) 
- Data to be shared with other 
programs, reserach inistitutions 
subject to confidentiality 
- Master State Database by 
municipality 
- Master Municipal 
Database  
- Selection of beneficiaries  
for State programs 
(and/or joining of state 
funds with federal 
program)
- Selection of 
beneficiaries 
Municipal programs 
(and/or joining of local 
funds with federal 
program) 
- Federal Single Registry 
of Beneficiaries 
- Issuance of payments to beneficiaries 
* Preferably by an autonomous agency   24
 
 
(7)  Invest in Stronger Implementation 
 
Investments should also be made in strengthening implementation, including: (a)  improving the 
assigning and cross-checking of identity numbers (NIS); (b) investing in the training of municipality officials 
and interviewers; (c)  designing an overall information strategy with appropriate systems to match; 
(d) improving and pre-testing software; (e) exploring the possibility of better in-field data entry and cross-
checking systems (to cross-check consistency of information, identify missing information in the field where 
verifications and re-visits can then be conducted); and (f)  improve coordination between government 
agencies at the municipal and federal level. 
 
(8)   Consider Other Technical Adjustments for the New Bolsa Família Program   
 
Some other technical factors should be considered when re-designing the registry and eligibility tools 
for the new Bolsa Família program.  First, under the Bolsa Família program, the family rather than the 
individual, constitutes the assistance unit.  An information system that clearly links family members (for 
eligibility and monitoring of conditionalities) to each other – and can check that each member is unique to 
each family (no double counting of individuals in multiple families) is needed.  Second, if time limits are 
imposed, the information system would also have to be able to track the time each family (or beneficiary?) 
benefits from the program so that they can be imposed.  Third, information systems should be designed to 
link the monitoring of conditionalities (by line ministries) to on-going eligibility and issuance of payments.   
 
Transitional Considerations: A Phased Approach 
Obviously, an overhaul of the Cadastro Único to remedy the issues highlighted above and implement 
the needed recommendations will take time.  A phased approach to introducing the new Bolsa 
Família program – which depends critically on a solid beneficiary selection process – is thus 
warranted.  To meet the needs of both moving fast to integrate the social programs, and taking the 
time to overhaul the family registry and eligibility process, the Government could consider a phased 
approach:   
 
First, it could launch an initial phase using data from the existing Cadastro Único and other 
beneficiary registries (e.g., SIBES for Bolsa Escola).  These data could be used as they are, whereby 
all those currently benefiting from the various programs will be shifted to the new payments and 
conditionality scheme under Bolsa Família.   This would simply require merging information from 
the existing Cadastro Único and other beneficiary registries (e.g., SIBES) and changing the benefits 
scheme. Alternatively, the Bolsa Família program could seek to modify eligibility criteria to get 
away from the problematic reliance on unverified incomes as the main screening factor.  For 
example, it could use a (temporary) weighting of incomes and those proxy variables that were 
collected in the existing Cadastro Único to refocus the program, giving priority to targeting the 
extreme poor (according to these variables).   
 
This could be followed by a second phase in which the pre-tested, new and improved family registry 
and eligibility system is ready.  In this second phase, all potential beneficiaries would have to 
reapply (or be re-surveyed depending on the area) under this new registry system in order to ensure 
proper transparency, improved targeting and updating of information.  This new system could be 
rolled out by municipality.   One way to prioritize municipalities to implement the new system would 
be to start with those with higher capacity for adopting such a scheme.  Another way would be to 
start with those municipalities in which the current Cadastro Único was not yet implemented (or 
implemented incompletely) so as to fill in those priority data gaps.   
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These transitional and phasing plans should be announced at the outset with a clear communications 
scheme, so that the public knows of improvements to come – and the need to reapply in phase two.  
With the elimination of interview/registry quotas (see above), a communications campaign should 
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